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As the United States, along with other nations, struggles to develop a response to climate
change, a swirl of overheated rhetoric and short-term political maneuvering is obscuring the basic
features of this issue. One day we hear that all responsible scientists agree that global warming is a
dagger at the heart of human civilization and that emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
greenhouse gases must be slashed immediately to save our planet. The next day we’re told that
global warming is the illegitimate offspring of sloppy science and green fanaticism and that laying a
finger on U.S. CO2 emissions would wreck our economy and enrich our foreign competitors.
This debate is motivated by intense, ongoing international negotiations on possible near-term
CO2 emission limits. The agenda for these negotiations, the so-called Berlin Mandate, was adopted
at the first conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Berlin
in 1995. Diplomats were told to devise a set of national ceilings for greenhouse gas emissions for
the early years of the next century. To make agreement more likely, developing countries were not
to be asked to control emissions, although they account for roughly half the greenhouse emissions
now and will emit a larger share in coming decades. These complex negotiations were to be
completed in just two years, in time for the third Conference of Parties this December in Kyoto,
Japan. Negotiations have become focused on a single question: how much will each of the
developed nations promise to cut CO2 emissions by 2010?
Our aim here is not to settle this near-term question, though the answer (if any) agreed to in
Kyoto may be of great environmental and economic importance. Instead, we will show, through a
brief look at the science and economics of climate, that if climate change turns out to be a serious
threat, an effective response will require a substantial and very long-term global effort. Today’s
focus on near-term emissions reductions will be counter-productive if it delays development of the
institutions and policy architectures that would be necessary to mount and sustain such an effort
over much of the next century.
What Do We Know About Global Warming?
Global warming or cooling can be driven by an imbalance between the energy the Earth
receives from the sun, largely as visible light, and the energy it radiates back to space as invisible
infrared light. The “greenhouse effect” is caused by the presence in the air of gases and clouds that
absorb some of the infrared light flowing upward and radiate it back downward. This warming
effect is opposed by substances at the surface and in the atmosphere that reflect sunlight directly
back into space. These include snow and desert sand, as well as clouds and aerosols from smog
and volcanic action. (Aerosols are very tiny, submicroscopic solid or liquid particles suspended in
the air. Smoke and fog are familiar examples.)
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2The most important greenhouse gas is water vapor, which typically remains for a week or so in
the atmosphere. Central to the climate change debate, however, are less important but much longer-
lived greenhouse gases, most notably CO2. Concern arises because the atmospheric concentrations
of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases have increased substantially over the past century.
When this happens, the flow of infrared energy to space is reduced, so that, all else equal, the
Earth receives slightly more energy than it radiates to space. This imbalance, which is often called
“radiative forcing,” tends to raise temperatures at the Earth’s surface. These aspects of the
greenhouse effect are not controversial. It is also generally accepted that emissions of CO2 from
combustion of fossil fuels (primarily coal, oil, and natural gas) are the most important way humans
can affect radiative forcing, and that this emitted CO2 remains in the atmosphere for a long time, on
the order of a century or so. Thus today’s radiative forcing reflects, in small part, the CO2 emitted
when coal was burned to keep President William McKinley warm in the White House.
What is much more uncertain, and the cause of serious scientific debate, is the response to
radiative forcing of the complex system that determines our climate. “Climate” is usefully defined
as the average of the weather we experience over a ten- or twenty-year time period. In this context,
it is important to emphasize that year-to-year changes in weather patterns or storm tracks should
not be, but often are, confused with climate change. Some poorly understood processes in the
climate system tend to amplify the warming effect of radiative forcing, while others, equally poorly
understood, tend to counteract or delay that effect.
To take a familiar example, clouds in the daytime provide a cooling mechanism by reflecting
sunlight back to space. But abundant clouds and high humidity at night help keep temperatures
high because they contribute to the greenhouse effect. This is why on clear, cloud-free nights we
can get rapid lowering of temperatures by tens of degrees Fahrenheit. Unfortunately, the processes
that drive long-term changes in daytime and nighttime humidity and cloud cover are not well
understood. Similarly, we know that any global warming will tend to be delayed because it takes a
lot of heat to warm the oceans, but we’re quite uncertain exactly how rapidly heat is carried into the
deeper parts of the ocean.
Computer models used to predict climate attempt to simulate these and many other important
processes on regional and global scales. These models are remarkable in their complexity and are
invaluable tools for scientific research. However, their complexity taxes the capabilities of the
world’s largest computers. Moreover, they are based on incomplete knowledge about the key
processes that control clouds, the ocean circulation, the natural cycles of greenhouse gases, and
natural (volcanic) and manmade (smog) aerosols. Current climate models cannot reproduce the
succession of ice ages and warm periods over the last 250,000 years, let alone the smaller climatic
changes observed over the last century. In addition, climate models are driven by forecasts of
emissions of greenhouse gases, and these rest on highly uncertain long-term forecasts of
population and economic growth and of technological advance.
To help quantify the uncertainty in climate forecasts, a group of scientists and economists at
MIT (including the authors) have recently developed a coupled model of global economic
development, climate processes, and ecosystems. This model is unique in its combination of
detailed treatments of the relevant natural and economic processes. Within this model, the
researchers have explored the consequences of a range of plausible assumptions about future
economic development (assuming no regulations are enacted to restrict future greenhouse gas
3emissions) and about fundamental climate processes, to produce a family of seven forecasts of
climate change over the next century. Each forecast in the family can be defended as reasonable
given current knowledge.
To illustrate the range of uncertainty
involved in climate forecasts, the first figure
shows the predictions for the change in global
average surface temperature from its 1990
value. Temperature increases by the year 2100
as small as two degrees Fahrenheit or as large
as nine degrees Fahrenheit can be defended as
plausible. About two thirds of the overall
difference here is due to uncertainty about
climate processes; the other third reflects
uncertainty about emissions. Despite a great
deal of research, we simply do not know which
of these paths (or indeed other plausible paths)
we are now on. Indeed, there may be rapid
climate changes driven by purely natural
processes that are not well handled by any
current climate models and are not reflected in
any of the forecasts shown here.
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Unfortunately, we know less about the likely impacts of plausible changes in climate than
about either future emissions or the natural processes determining climate. Warming may increase
storm damage, for instance, but it may also decrease it. Almost nothing is known about likely (as
opposed to possible) impacts on human health or about the ability of unmanaged ecosystems to
adapt to climate change. Civilization has adapted to climate change in the past and can, to at least
some degree, adapt to future changes. What we do know suggests that the changes summarized by
the lowest path in the figure would do little harm over the next century and might even be beneficial
on balance for some countries. Most analysts would agree, however, that the highest path would
correspond to significant risks to a variety of important natural processes (including ocean
circulation, polar glaciers, and unmanaged ecosystems) as well as to agriculture and other human
activity.
In some respects the most important finding of climate research is that the range of possible
outcomes is enormous. We believe it is impossible to make sound policy decisions in this field
without taking explicit account of this profound uncertainty. In addition, it is plainly vital to
continue research aimed at improving emissions forecasts, climate models, and impact estimates in
order to narrow the range of plausible forecasts. An important component of this work is the
search for a so-called “fingerprint” that would reveal human influence on the climate system.
Has Human-Induced Warming Begun?
Last year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared in its Summary for
Policymakers that “the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on climate.”
There were some qualifications and hedging in the Summary and much more in the detailed
4Working Group Report upon which it was based. Nevertheless this statement, largely in isolation,
was widely reported and has since shaped policy discussions around the world. But was this
isolated, unqualified summary statement, written by governments’ representatives, a scientifically
defensible conclusion?
To establish a human influence on the global climate, we would ideally want to show that the
observed global patterns of climate change over the past 100 years, say, are consistent with those
predicted by climate models which include human activities such as production of CO2 and
aerosols from fossil fuels, but are not consistent with the patterns predicted when those activities
are omitted. The latter predictions would reflect the natural variability of climate—the “noise” out
of which the human “signal” (or “fingerprint”) must arise for a definitive detection. Unfortunately,
current climate models are both uncertain predictors of the climate response to human influences
and inadequate tools for assessing natural variability. In addition, data on the global climate and
human influences in past decades, and our understanding of the cooling effects of manmade
aerosols, are far from ideal.
For these and other reasons, some scientists have been skeptical about the IPCC’s “balance of
evidence” statement from the beginning. This group has grown substantially over time. Even some
scientists who were significantly involved in producing the IPCC statement are now publicly
expressing doubts. In an important news report on this subject in the journal Science in May 1997,
Richard A. Kerr describes the growing skepticism about the original IPCC Summary conclusion,
and the growing realization that it may be a decade or more before the human effects can be
discerned above the noise of natural climate variability.
This does not mean that we should wait to take action until and unless human effects on climate
are definitively detected. As the discussion above indicates, we know enough to know that
significant global warming, with significant adverse impacts, may occur in the future. It would be
irresponsible to ignore such a risk, just as it would be irresponsible to do nothing when you smell
smoke at home until and unless you see flames. It would also be irresponsible, of course, to call the
fire department and hose down all your belongings at the slightest whiff of what might be smoke.
Nevertheless, the search for a definitive detection of human-induced climate change can
provide valuable information for the policy process. The figure above provides a simplified
illustration of the point involved. The shaded region at the bottom represents a plausible estimate of
the range of natural variability or noise in global mean temperature over the course of a century. As
the figure shows, the greater the eventual warming, the sooner observed temperatures will rise
above this range, and the signal of a human influence will emerge from this noise. (This
conclusion holds whatever the noise level; higher noise levels simply imply later detection, all else
equal.) The larger the human effects on climate, the sooner it should be possible to find definitive
evidence of those effects, and the stronger will likely be the case for substantial emissions
reductions.
Should Global Warming Be Stopped?
If climate change turns out to be a serious problem, the sorts of emissions reductions being
fiercely debated in the run-up to the Kyoto meeting will not by themselves do much to solve it.
Under the Berlin Mandate, emission reductions are to be sought only from countries listed in
Annex I to the original climate treaty: the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
5and Development (OECD) as of 1990 (Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan) and the “economies in transition” (Eastern Europe and most of the Former
Soviet Union). To illustrate the effects of restrictions limited to these nations, let us consider one of
the toughest proposals now on the table: the call by the European Union (EU) to cut Annex I CO2
emissions to 15% below 1990 levels by 2010.
When measured not in relation to 1990 but against emissions today or those expected in
another 13 years, this proposal would require much more than a than a 15% reduction in most
countries. There is little doubt that such sharp cuts in CO2 emissions over little more than a decade
would be very expensive, even if economic growth were to slow from its pace in recent decades. It
would be even harder for Annex I nations to maintain the proposed 2010 level of emissions for the
rest of the next century. Yet, largely because of projected emissions growth in the developing
world, the MIT climate model shows that such a costly effort by the Annex I countries would
reduce projected warming in 2100 by only about 20 percent in the mid-range of the forecasts
illustrated in the first figure. If climate change turns out to be a serious threat, this response, by
itself, would be inadequate; if it turns out not to be a threat, this response would be a large-scale
waste of resources.
A policy aimed at reducing near-term emissions may, if properly designed, be a valuable first
step toward a more serious (and even more expensive) response strategy that could be used if we
learn that human-induced warming is a serious threat. The Framework Convention on Climate
Change calls for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels that will
avoid “danger” to economies and ecosystems. The European Union, among others, has
recommended stabilizing the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere at 550 parts per million,
which is roughly twice pre-industrial levels. Doing this would substantially slow (but not stop)
climate change. Following the particular path to stabilization at this level that was estimated by the
IPCC would lower the projected warming in 2100 in the mid-range forecast in the earlier figure by
only about 30%, though it would have larger relative effects in the following century.
Following this EU recommendation would
require sharp cuts in global CO2 emissions,
however, and the Annex I nations almost
certainly could not do the job by themselves. We
can illustrate the magnitude of the task using a
mid-range forecast from the set shown in the
first figure, along with the IPCC’s estimate of a
global emissions path that would lead to the 550
parts per million target. The second figure
shows the maximum Annex I emissions
consistent with this path, assuming that non-
Annex I nations accept no restrictions. (To
calculate the emissions allowed to Annex I
countries, we simply subtracted the forecasted
non-Annex I emissions from the global total.)
Without participation by the developing world,
emissions by Annex I nations would somehow
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have to become negative around the middle of the next century! Even a total ban on all use of fossil
fuels in all developed nations within a few decades would not do the job.
Of course, if the richer nations continue to reduce emissions over time some voluntary
abatement by non-Annex I nations would probably occur. Over the coming decades, some non-
Annex I nations will no doubt become wealthy enough to join the Annex I emissions reduction
club voluntarily. But the countries most likely to do this account for only a small fraction of
projected non-Annex I emissions. In China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and other high-population,
high-emissions countries, income growth seems unlikely to stimulate voluntary abatement much
before the end of the next century. Until then, these nations will be more concerned with feeding
themselves and their children than with protecting their grandchildren from potential global
warming. Thus, if the rich countries want to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, they will
have to pay poor countries to reduce their emissions. Rough estimates of the costs that would be
involved, even assuming fully efficient abatement policies and neglecting costs of monitoring and
enforcement, imply massive international transfers of wealth on a scale well beyond anything in
recorded history.
What Should We Do Now?
There is little or no political support today for a long-term commitment to such a Herculean
effort. Moreover, since climate change could turn out to be relatively harmless, making such a
commitment now would make little economic sense. On the other hand, since climate change may
also be a significant threat, it would make no more sense to do nothing. Unfortunately, there are no
simple rules that can be relied upon to tell us what to do. We must consider costs and risks and
take actions in the face of profound uncertainty about their consequences.
In such a setting, it is important not to lose the long-term perspective. Today’s actions should
aim to reduce the costs of massive global emissions reductions, in case advances in climate science
show such reductions to be desirable. Investments in new technology and in the development of
policy architectures and institutions are particularly attractive in this regard. While it is almost
certainly too late to agree on investments of this sort before December’s Kyoto meeting, that
meeting is but one step in what will very likely be a long political and diplomatic process.
Whatever else happens there, the participants will produce some sort of “Kyoto Mandate” to guide
the next round of international negotiations. That Mandate should focus the process on investments
with long-term benefits.
The potential value of investments in new technology is clear. It may well prove impossible to
slow warming appreciably without condemning much of the world to poverty unless carbon-free
energy sources become roughly competitive with conventional fossil sources. Further, a serious
attempt to produce important new technological options would be cheap relative to the cost of
controlling emissions resulting from the use of current technologies. The range of possible options
is wide, stretching from solar electricity to the continued use of fossil fuels with capture and
sequestration of the CO2 their combustion produces.
Unfortunately, we know too little about what produces fundamental technical change. The
available evidence points to the importance of marketplace incentives for private sector research and
development and (with somewhat more controversy) to public expenditure on basic research and
fundamental technologies. Politicians love to call for more research instead of more regulation, but
7we see only a tiny and diminishing commitment to the development of greenhouse-friendly
technology by those countries most capable of performing it.
It is at least as important to begin the development of an institutional structure for managing
global emissions agreements that can evolve easily over time. Such a structure must be able to
adjust the stringency of abatement effort to the evolving science, giving incentives for national
participation but accommodating failures along the way, and to provide compensation to induce
participation by the developing world.
This is a tall order, and we do not pretend to know the best design. Some useful insight and
perspective can be gained from the international trade regime developed under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization. This regime has
grown and evolved over time, adding countries and goods along the way, peacefully resolving
substantial conflicts in national economic interests, contributing importantly to global economic
growth, and producing a stunning success by the standards of international affairs. But it has taken
50 years of hard work to do this!
In this connection, experimenting with national emission ceilings of the type that are the near-
total focus of the Berlin Mandate process may be of long-term value. Naturally, one objective of
such an effort is to make actual reductions in the quantities of greenhouse gases we would
otherwise put into the atmosphere over the next decade or two. We do not belittle this motivation.
But it should not be allowed to completely dominate the design of international agreements in this
area. Such experiments will be of long-term value only to the extent that they facilitate development
of sets of possible policy measures, a policy architecture if you will, that can, if necessary,
contribute to effective and cost-efficient stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations. This
architecture would need to address all important sources and sinks of significant greenhouse gases,
not just CO2 produced from fossil fuels. Such a system would need to provide for reliable
emissions monitoring and for some system of sanctions for those who violate their obligations. A
host of other important issues must also be confronted.
For example, since global participation will be necessary if global emissions are to be reduced,
it is important to structure any Annex I targets and timetables to facilitate the inclusion of non-
Annex I countries. This involves, at a minimum, development of a regime to govern climate-related
international wealth transfers. In this regard, the Berlin Mandate’s exclusive focus on Annex I
countries is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, unless the rich nations control their emissions
first and support abatement by poor nations, the latter are unlikely even to slow their emissions
growth. On the other hand, CO2 emissions controls will raise the cost of producing energy-
intensive goods in Annex I countries, tending to encourage the development of energy-intensive
industries in non-Annex I nations. (This is sometimes referred to as “emissions leakage.”) Once
this has happened, non-Annex I nations will be more reluctant to take actions to curb the CO2
emissions that have become a more important source of wealth. Attempts by the rich Annex I
countries to use trade policies to slow the migration of energy-intensive industries to poorer nations
may create major international tensions.
In order to minimize the global cost of CO2 emissions reductions, the cheapest abatement
opportunities should be exploited first. In principle, a regime involving emissions trading, like that
used to control sulfur dioxide pollution in the U.S., could contribute substantial savings. But this
approach, which has been advanced by the U.S. in the ongoing negotiations, runs into a problem
8if participation is restricted to Annex I countries. Trading can only work effectively among
countries that have agreed to emissions caps. Without the participation of the developing countries,
where most observers agree that many of the cheaper emissions reductions are to be found, the
advantages of trading are drastically reduced.
Finally, agreeing to lower future emissions may increase incentives to develop energy-saving
consumer devices, along with low-carbon energy sources. But commitments to modest, short-term
emissions reductions may focus R&D efforts on small advances over current technologies.
Credible commitments to substantial, long-term reductions may be necessary to stimulate the
fundamental research necessary to produce needed breakthroughs in energy technology. Lack of
adequate political support seems to rule out making such commitments now, however, and the
inability of any government to bind its successors would limit the credibility of any long-term
commitments that were made.
*          *         *
Unless climate scientists discover soon that greenhouse warming is definitely not a threat, the
struggle to devise a global response will occupy our children, along with their children and
grandchildren. We have discussed three legacies that our generation could leave that would make
this struggle easier: (1) an international climate agreement that could, if necessary, reduce
greenhouse gas emissions substantially, at least cost, while being responsive both to changes in
our scientific understanding and to evolving political and economic conditions, (2) enhanced
technical options that could, if necessary, ease the task of maintaining economic growth while
controlling greenhouse gas emissions, and (3) an international system that could, if necessary,
transfer substantial sums to developing countries to assist their participation in an emissions control
effort. Building these legacies is a huge challenge, but this task merits at least the same sense of
urgency that has motivated pre-Kyoto negotiations about short-term CO2 emissions reductions.
